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Continuous-variable quantum key distribution with a leakage from state preparation
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(Dated: March 12, 2018)
We address side-channel leakage in a trusted preparation station of continuous-variable quantum
key distribution with coherent and squeezed states. We consider two different scenarios: multimode
Gaussian modulation, directly accessible to an eavesdropper, or side-channel loss of the signal states
prior to the modulation stage. We show the negative impact of excessive modulation on both the
coherent- and squeezed-state protocols. The impact is more pronounced for squeezed-state protocols
and may require optimization of squeezing in the case of noisy quantum channels. Further, we
demonstrate that the coherent-state protocol is immune to side-channel signal state leakage prior to
modulation, while the squeezed-state protocol is vulnerable to such attacks, becoming more sensitive
to the noise in the channel. In the general case of noisy quantum channels the signal squeezing can be
optimized to provide best performance of the protocol in the presence of side-channel leakage prior
to modulation. Our results demonstrate that leakage from the trusted source in continuous-variable
quantum key distribution should not be underestimated and squeezing optimization is needed to
overcome coherent state protocols.
PACS numbers: 03.67.Hk, 03.67.Dd
I. INTRODUCTION
Any practical realization of quantum key distribution
(QKD) (see [1] for reviews) deals with imperfections of
real physical devices, which may be unaccounted in ide-
alized security proofs. For example, it is well known that
QKD systems based on direct photodetection [discrete-
variable (DV) protocols] can be compromised by specific
response of photodetectors to intense light, called blind-
ing [2]. On the other hand, an eavesdropper can im-
plement so-called Trojan horse attacks in order to get
information about the modulator settings from the back-
reflected light [3] or use state preparation and encod-
ing flaws in DV QKD protocols [4, 5] as well as benefit
from information leakage, e.g., from auxiliary degrees of
freedom of carrier states [6]. Continuous-variable (CV)
QKD protocols (see [7] for reviews), based on the ho-
modyne detection, can be robust against blinding, but
are potentially vulnerable to other practical attacks, such
as a wavelength attack on the homodyne detector [8] or
continuous-variable counterpart of Trojan horse attacks
[9].
Most of the practical attacks on the QKD devices can
be in principle ruled out using device-independent real-
ization of QKD [10] which, however, is very challenging
(as it requires strongly entangled states and almost per-
fect detectors) and impractical, being limited to channels
with high transmittance. There were also measurement-
device independent (MDI) QKD protocols suggested and
implemented, which rule out detector attacks [11], but
keep the source potentially vulnerable, while still being
limited mostly to highly transmitting channels in the case
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of CV QKD [12].
Another method to make QKD more robust against
practical imperfections and, at the same time, efficient
and stable in conditions of strongly attenuating and noisy
channels, is to distinguish between trusted devices (such
as source and detector) and untrusted channel (the latter
being under full control of an eavesdropper), which can
be done by proper set-up characterization. Trusted par-
ties can then identify possible sources of side information
available to an eavesdropper, and take them into account
in security analysis. In the field of CV QKD this included
consideration of already mentioned specific detection at-
tacks [8, 13] , analysis of source imperfections [14–17],
and role of multimode structure of state preparation and
detection [18]. Trusted device imperfections may be un-
der partial control of an eavesdropper so that an out-
put of internal loss in a device may contribute to eaves-
droppers knowledge on the raw key though information
leakage (side-channel loss) or so that the noise imposed
by trusted device imperfections may be controlled by an
eavesdropper to corrupt the data (side-channel noise).
Such side channels, based on the basic linear coupling
to vacuum or noisy modes, were previously considered
on the detection and preparation sides of the protocol,
assuming side-channel interaction after the modulation
stage [19]. However, loss occurs as well on the stage of
state preparation (e.g., it is well known that loss in the
source reduces the level of squeezing [20]). On the other
hand, modulation can be applied to many modes at once
[18] and some of the modes may be directly accessible
by an eavesdropper which may result in a zero-error se-
curity break similar to a photon-number-splitting attack
in DV QKD [21] enabled by multiphoton generation in a
signal source. Therefore, in the current paper we analyze
side-channel leakage in the trusted station prior to modu-
lation (side-channel attack on the signal states) and also
consider multimode modulation such that the auxiliary
2modes are directly available to an eavesdropper.
In our study we assume basic linear passive coupling
with the side channels; we also assume that the trusted
parties can be aware of the side channels presence in the
trusted source (e.g., by characterizing their devices prior
to and during the protocol implementation using local
measurements; otherwise the side channel loss would be
attributed to the main untrusted channel), but are not
able to remove them and stop the potential information
leakage. We consider two main classes of CV QKD proto-
cols, namely coherent-state and squeezed-state Gaussian
protocols. We show that both multimode modulation
and side-channel attack on the signal can undermine se-
curity of CV QKD protocols. Moreover, such attacks
appear to be surprisingly more harmful for the squeezed-
state protocol, once the channel noise is low. For more
noisy channels and combination of side-channel imperfec-
tions the protocol implementation should be optimized to
provide security and maximum performance.
The paper is structured as follows. In Sec. II we de-
scribe the mechanism of multimode modulation leakage,
starting with the CV QKD model description and secu-
rity analysis (Sec. II A) following with the description of
consequences for coherent- and squeezed-state protocols
under individual and collective attacks [22–25] and dis-
tinction between direct and reverse reconciliation (Sec.
II B) [26, 27]. In Sec. III we first describe the model and
methods used for security analysis of the side-channel
attack on the signal states (Sec.III A) and further char-
acterize the impact of such an attack on the security of
CV QKD protocols with direct and reverse reconciliation
under individual and collective attacks (Sec. III B).
II. LEAKAGE FROM MULTIMODE
MODULATOR
A. Security analysis
We examine the effect of the presence and consequent
modulation of signal states in additional modes gener-
ated by the source on the preparation side of a generic
Gaussian CV QKD protocol, illustrated in Fig. 1a. Fol-
lowing the steps of a common CV QKD protocol [26, 28]
the trusted sender party prepares either coherent (us-
ing a laser source) or squeezed (using, e.g., the op-
tical parametric oscillator) state characterized by the
X or P quadrature (with both quadratures being in-
terchangeable) value QS with zero mean and variance
VS = 〈Q2S〉 − 〈QS〉2 (for the coherent-state protocol
VS = 1, while for the squeezed-state protocol signal
quadrature variance VS < 1, so that the uncertainty re-
lation is maintained as VXVP > 1). Despite the state
generated, Alice then applies both amplitude and phase
quadrature modulation according to values QM from
two independent Gaussian distributions, with variance
VM = 〈Q2M 〉 − 〈QM 〉2, to the output mode of the source
so that the state entering the untrusted quantum channel
and sent to Bob is characterized by the quadrature value
QB = QS +QM and variance VB = VS + VM .
The source used by the sender can have a multimodal
structure but it is usually presumed that Alice fully con-
trols all the output of the source. In this work we assume
that the source in addition to the main mode, charac-
terized by the quadrature value QS with variance VS ,
can produce additional N leakage modes [Fig. 1a, or-
ange line], which are characterized by the quadrature
values QLn with respective variances VLn , that are not
blocked or filtered by trusted parties. This results in am-
plitude and phase modulation being applied to the leak-
age modes as well. The signal state noise and modulation
are trusted, but the leaking output is fully available to
Eve.
Generally additional mode modulation VM,Ln may dif-
fer from the modulation VM applied to the signal mode,
therefore we characterize the relation between them by
the ratio VM,Ln/VM = k. If the k = 0 additional mode
is not modulated at all, this results in the state with the
initial quadrature value QLn , while for k < 1 an addi-
tional mode receives a fraction of the signal modulation.
Alternatively, leakage mode amplitude or phase quadra-
ture displacements can correspond to a Gaussian distri-
bution that has higher variance than that of the signal
mode, corresponding to k > 1. In other words the encod-
ing alphabet of the secondary mode can be bigger than
that of the signal mode, however excessive letters remain
correlated to the signal alphabet. The signal state and
the additional modulated state after the modulation are
correlated as CSLn = kVM , while leakage modes are cor-
related between each other as CLnLm = k
2VM .
After the preparation stage the signal QB travels
through the untrusted quantum channel (which is gen-
erally lossy and noisy, but for simplicity let us first
consider the case of noiseless channel), where it is be-
ing measured by a homodyne detector. After the un-
trusted channel, Bob receives the state with quadrature
values Q′B = (QS + QM )
√
η + Q0
√
1− η with variance
V ′B = (VS+VM −1)η+1, where Q0 is a quadrature value
of the vacuum state that is coupled to the signal state
in the channel and has variance V0 = 〈Q20〉 − 〈Q0〉2 = 1.
An eavesdropper, after the signal passes through the un-
trusted channel, is able to acquire and store mode E
with QE = −(QS + QM )
√
1− η + Q0√η and variance
VE = (VS +VM )(1− η)+ η, and additional source modes
Ln (n ∈ [1, N ]) with Q′Ln = QLn + kQM with variance
V ′Ln = VLn + k
2VM . After the signal state is transferred
through the untrusted channel, initial correlations with
the leakage mode are lowered by channel transmittance
as C′SLn = kVM
√
η.
To get analytical insights into the security of the pro-
tocol, and understand to basic limitations, we first study
the case of individual attacks in a noiseless channel [as
in Fig. 1a]. To purely see limitations by the leakage,
we consider all data post-processing to be fully efficient.
The lower bound on the secure key rate [29] under such
attack is
3(a) Multimode modulation (b) Premodulation channel
FIG. 1. Prepare-and-measure CV QKD schemes with lossy channels and information leakage from state preparation stations
(dashed boxes indicate trusted stations of Alice and Bob). Source V radiates Gaussian states (coherent or squeezed states)
in the signal mode (green). States receive amplitude and phase displacements on modulator MS, and are sent to Bob via
quantum channel characterized by losses η. Signal states are measured on the receiver station by a homodyne detector H .
(a) In addition to signal mode, the source generates additional leakage mode (orange line) L. States in the latter undergo
displacement, correlated to the one of the main signal and characterized by modulation ratio k. An eavesdropper Eve can
directly obtain information from additional mode as well as from quantum channel. The mode L is present due to the
multimode structure of the source and cannot be technically eliminated. Generally an arbitrary amount of modes Ln can be
modulated and leak, however such case can be reduced to a single effective mode Leff .(b) A side-channel leakage (orange line)
is present between state generation and state modulation stages. Initial signal state interacts with another state of mode ES
on a beam-splitter with transmittance ηE , and only after that is being encoded with information on the modulator MS. Eve
can obtain information from ES and quantum channels.
R|indRR(DR) = IAB − IBE(AE), (1)
where IXY is the mutual information between respective
parties, DR and RR stand for direct reconciliation (when
Alice is the reference side of error correction) and reverse
reconciliation (when Bob is the reference side [25]), re-
spectively. The state measured by an eavesdropper, can
consist of (N + 1) modes, including the untrusted quan-
tum channel. Multimode modulation does not change the
mutual information between trusted parties, and it cor-
responds to the one in conventional single-mode prepare-
and-measure (P&M) CV QKD protocols (binary loga-
rithm indicates that units of information are bits) [17]:
IAB =
1
2
log2

 VM
VM − ηV
2
M
η(VS+VM−1)+1

 . (2)
Eve’s mutual information with the trusted side de-
pends on the variance of the state of a trusted party
conditioned by the measurements of all the modes, avail-
able to Eve, VA(B)|E for direct or reverse reconciliation,
respectively. For any N leakage modes such a state can
be reduced to VA(B)|ELeff , where E is obtained from
propagation losses in the quantum channel and Leff is
the equivalent effective single-mode leakage. Second mo-
ments of the effective leakage mode in the signal quadra-
ture and new effective modulation ratio can be, respec-
tively, written as
VLeff =
N∑N
n V
−1
Ln
, (3)
keff = k
√
N. (4)
In order to provide an extensive analysis of CV QKD
protocols we examine the possible collective attacks that
may be performed by Eve, resulting in the lower bound
on the secure key rate given by
R|colRR(DR) = βIAB − χBE(AE), (5)
where β accounts for limited post-processing efficiency,
mutual information IAB remains the same as in Eq. (2),
while the information obtainable by the untrusted party
is upper limited by the Holevo bound χBE(AE) [30] in
either reverse or direct reconciliation. In the limit of an
infinite block size Eq. (5) also corresponds to the key
rate under coherent attacks [31]. Under collective at-
tacks Eq. (3) does not apply, however, second moments
of the effective leakage mode can be found numerically.
Nevertheless, provided that all Ln have the same initial
variance VL, and multimode modulator [ML on Fig.1a]
outputs N leakage modes V ′L = VL + k
2VM , the effec-
tive mode will have VL,eff = VL with modulation ra-
tio (4). We will further consider only the case with one
additional mode (L) keeping in mind that a more gen-
eral situation can be reduced to the single-mode one.
The equivalent entanglement-based CV QKD scheme,
enabling purification-based security analysis in the case
of collective attacks [17] corresponding to Fig. 1a, due
to the fact that a fraction of the correlated modulation
leaked is unknown to trusted parties, is nontrivial. One
way to find the solution is by applying the Bloch-Messiah
reduction theorem [32] (for more details on security anal-
ysis see Appendix A).
4(bits per channel use)
(km)
FIG. 2. Key rate (in bits per channel use) versus distance d
(in kilometers) in a standard telecom fiber (with attenuation
of −0.2dB/km) under collective attacks in the case of modu-
lation leakage for different values of ratio between additional
and signal states modulation variances k = 0 (blue, upper
lines), 1 (light blue, middle lines), 1.5 (light green, lower lines)
for optimized squeezed-state protocol (solid lines), squeezed-
state protocol (dashed lines) with VL = VS = 1/2 and coher-
ent state protocol with VL = VS = 1 (dotted lines). Modu-
lation variance VM is optimized for given parameters, excess
noise ε = 1%, post-processing efficiency β = 97%. Evidently
the distance is shortened by modulation leakage. Squeezing
optimization allows to achieve overall longer secure distances.
Comparing unoptimized squeezing- and coherent-state proto-
cols, the first one prevails under weak leakage k 6 1, the latter
under stronger leakage k > 1.
B. Coherent- and squeezed-state protocols
Direct reconciliation. This reconciliation scheme,
which is more suitable for short distance channels, being
limited by −3dB of loss, is extremely sensitive to the
information leakage from the additional source mode. In
the limit of ideal state propagation through the quantum
channel used by trusted parties η → 1, and symmetry of
the variances V = VL = VS , the key rate (1) reads
RDR ≈
1
2
(
[η − 1]VM
V log[2]
(2k2VM + V )
2
k2VM + V
+ log
2
[
VM + V
k2VM + V
])
.
(6)
It is evident from Eq. (6) that even if the quantum chan-
nel is perfect (η = 1) for arbitrary values of signal modu-
lation the security is lost if the secondary mode receives
the same modulation as the signal mode (k = 1). In
the absence of symmetry of variances VL 6= VS excessive
modulation can still lead to a security break even if in-
put of the leaking modes are noisy coherent states with
VL ≥ 1.
Reverse reconciliation. Again, assuming that all
modes radiated by the source have the same variance
V = VL = VS in the limit of strong modulation (VM →
∞) the key rate (1) reads
RVM→∞|indRR = −
1
2
log2
[(
1− η + ηk
2
V (1 + k2)
)
× (1 + η[V − 1])
]
. (7)
If the leakage mode will be completely neglected trusted
parties would underestimate Eves knowledge about the
key that will lead to falsely estimated key rate:
R
(false)
VM→∞
|indRR = −
1
2
log2{(1− η)[1 + η(V − 1)]}. (8)
While mutual information (2) between Alice and Bob
remains the same in Eqs. (7) and (8), the cost of under-
estimation of mutual information VB|E between Bob and
Eve is −1/2 log2{(1−η)/(1−η+k2η/[V (k2+1)])}. Such
cost for fixed k is the highest for short distance η → 1
and high squeezing V → 0, hence conditions which allow
the high false key rate (8) will in fact be security breaking
and yield a negative actual key rate (7).
The correlated modulation kVM that leaks to the un-
trusted party makes the protocol sensitive not only to
losses in the quantum channel η, but also to the initial
state squeezing V and the state modulation VM ; security
is always limited by the presence of the second source
mode for η < 1. The more the squeezed initial state V is,
the smaller the fraction of the modulation VM is needed
to be revealed to an eavesdropper to break the security of
the protocol. In the limit of infinite squeezing V → 0 for
any nonzero modulation ratio k, the secure protocol can-
not be established since the term contributing to Eve’s
information k2/[V (1+k2)] in Eq. (7) approaches infinity,
i.e., Eve is able to collect an accurate copy of the signal
modulation directly from a leakage channel, without any
attack on the main channel.
However, if the coherent-state protocol is used with
V = 1, one can see from Eq. (7) that the secure key
rate remains positive for any arbitrary amounts of cor-
related modulation leakage. For a long distance with
small η ≪ 1, we get always the positive secure key rate
η/(ln 4(1+k2)). The key rate drops with longer distance,
but never vanishes completely.
Equation (7) also allows one to assess the maximal tol-
erable kmax ratio for high signal-state modulation:
kmax|VM→∞ =
√
V (η − 2 + V − ηV )
(η − 1)(V − 1)2 , (9)
and immediately see that protocols can tolerate excess
mode modulation with any ratio k as long as either η = 1
(quantum channel is perfect) or V = 1 (coherent-state
protocol is used).
Given that at V = k2/(1 + k2) the key rate (7) becomes
R = −1/2 log2[1−η+ηk2/(1+k2)], and it is the same as
when the coherent-state protocol is used (V = 1), there-
fore the amount of squeezing needed to reach improve-
ment over the coherent-state protocol is independent of
channel losses η and is bounded as
5k2
1 + k2
< V < 1, (10)
with squeezing that maximizes the key rate (7) being
V opt|VM→∞ =
√
k2
1 + k2
. (11)
With the increase of the modulation ratio k it is clear
from Eqs. (10) and (11) that the coherent-state pro-
tocol is optimal in this regime, however, for low k, the
optimized squeezed state protocol can yield significantly
higher secure key rates.
One has to address an important aspect of the CV
QKD system with multimode modulation—the difference
between states in signal and leakage modes. Generally if
the effective leaking state is initially more squeezed than
the signal (VL < VS) it is more beneficial for an eaves-
dropper. An opposite effect is true as well—if the leaking
state is initially less squeezed (VL > VS), the tolerance of
protocols to modulation leakage is significantly improved,
however, security is still limited by the leakage. For fixed
state variance VL in the secondary source mode, optimal
V optS < VL, provided k < 1, but V
opt
S > VL if k > 1.
If noise is present in the channel one has to consider
an equivalent entanglement-based CV QKD scheme for
security analysis [33]. Results obtained for the protocols
in realistic conditions (limited post-processing efficiency
β and noisy quantum channel, characterized by losses η
and noise ε) under collective attacks complement the pre-
ceding results for individual attacks. For any nonunity
β, the signal modulation VM must be limited and opti-
mized [34]. Leakage does have an impact on the optimal
modulation value, but if the perfect post-processing algo-
rithm (β = 1) is used, the key rate (5) as a the function
of modulation VM is still monotonically increasing. De-
spite the states in the signal VS and leakage VL modes
the excessive modulation is security breaking.
Let us look at the case when the source generates iden-
tical states into signal and leakage modes V = VL = VS .
In terms of secure distance (Fig. 2), the protocol with
broadly accessible squeezing [35] of signal states to −3dB
below the shot-noise unit (SNU) is able to prevail over
the coherent-state protocol given the limited modulation
ratio k < 1. On the other hand the coherent-state proto-
col is less sensitive to leakage and can be used on longer
distances if the modulation ratio is higher, k > 1 (lower
lines in Fig. 2). In fact, in such a regime even the noisy
coherent-state protocol [15, 36, 37] can achieve a higher
key rate than squeezed-state protocol, provided excess
noise ε in the channel is low enough.
However, in order to achieve best results under multi-
mode modulation leakage with an arbitrary modulation
ratio k, squeezing optimization is suggested. Optimal
squeezing [similarly as in Eq. (11)] lowers with leakage
increase, and approaches unity V opt → 1 for high k, e.g.,
(bits per channel use)
FIG. 3. Performance of the squeezed-state protocol with and
leakage from the modulator under collective attacks. The
coherent-state protocol, due to combined effects of modu-
lation leakage, excess noise and limited post-processing ef-
ficiency, cannot be used for secure key generation at given
parameters. Key rate dependency on the leaked modulation
ratio k is shown for different values of squeezing (starting
from top) VS=0.1, 0.3, 0.5, 0.7, 0.9 SNU. All solid lines dis-
play the key rate with the symmetry of signal and leakage
variances (VL = VS). The thick (orange) line illustrates the
key rate of the protocol with both modulation VM and signal
squeezing VS optimized. Dashed lines display the case when
leakage mode input is fixed and independent of the signal
(VL = 1). Lowest solid and dashed lines, corresponding to
VS = 0.9 very nearly overlap. Signal modulation is optimized
for given parameters. Reconciliation efficiency β = 95%,
channel losses η = 0.1, and excess noise ε = 1%. Apparently
the squeezed-state protocol is sensitive to leakage, especially
for high squeezing. Provided that the source outputs identi-
cal states, security is broken when leakage is larger than half
of the signal modulation. Robustness to leakage is higher if
VL > VS, but leakage remains a security threat. Squeezing
optimization (thick, orange line) heightens robustness and the
key rate, but it’s not sufficient to maintain security for arbi-
trary amounts of leakage.
in Fig. 2 optimal squeezing V opt < 1/2 for k = 0, 1 (up-
per and middle lines respectively), while for k = 1.5 less
squeezing is required 1 > V opt > 1/2 to achieve longer
secure distance.
Squeezed-state protocol susceptibility to leakage is fur-
ther illustrated in Fig.3. Highly squeezed states are
clearly more sensitive to leakage, but lower squeezing
does not necessarily yield higher tolerance to leakage.
Contrary to the case of purely lossy channels, where the
coherent-state protocol has a nonvanishing key rate for
an arbitrary modulation leakage, it may not always be
suitable for secure key generation in noisy channels. The
squeezed-state protocol remains sensitive even if states
in the leakage mode have fixed variance VL = const and
are independent of signal VS (Fig. 3). Squeezing opti-
mization in such a regime can still be effective, especially
under strong leakage k ≫ 1.
6III. PREMODULATION LEAKAGE
A. Security analysis
In this section we will describe and examine another
type of threat that may occur on a trusted preparation
side of a Gaussian CV QKD system described in the be-
ginning of the previous section (with absence of multi-
mode modulation). Differently fom the previous section,
we now consider the presence of a channel between the
source and modulator, modeled as linear coupling to a
vacuum mode, as shown in Fig.1b. The signal gener-
ated by the source, with the quadrature value QS , prior
to the modulation stage is linearly coupled to the mode
ES with the coupling ratio ηE . Signal states have zero
mean of quadratures and variances VS = 〈Q2S〉 − 〈QS〉2,
while states in the premodulation channel ES are vac-
uum. During modulation (on modulator MS) Alice ap-
plies displacement QM with 〈Q2M 〉 − 〈QM 〉2 = VM to
both quadratures of the signal states, resulting in a
state QB = QS
√
ηE + QES
√
1− ηE + QM with vari-
ance VB = ηE(VS − 1) + VM + 1. Eve can gain infor-
mation from states Q′ES = QES
√
ηE − QS
√
1− ηE and
Q′E = QE
√
η − (QS√ηE +QES√1− ηE +QM)√1− η,
obtained respectively from quantum and premodulation
channels. After the signal passes through the purely lossy
untrusted channel and arrives at the trusted receiver side
its variance before measurement is
V ′B = [ηE(VX(P ),S − 1) + VM ]η + 1, (12)
where η characterizes the loss rate in the transmitting
channel. General correlations between Eve’s states are
described as
CES ,EC = (VS − VES )
√
(1− η)(1 − ηE)ηE , (13)
while correlations between the signal state and output of
the premodulation channel are scaled by the transmit-
tance in the quantum channel,
CB,ES = (VES − VS)
√
η(1− ηE)ηE . (14)
Using the expressions above we can write the mutual in-
formation between Alice and Bob as
IAB =
1
2
log2
VM
VM − V
2
M
η
VMη+(VS−1)ηEη+1
. (15)
Similarly we can find the mutual information between
Eve and the respective trusted reference side and apply
Eq. (1) for analysis of individual attacks. For general
analysis we adopt the recently introduced general purifi-
cation scheme [19] and proceed with an estimation of the
CV QKD protocols behavior under collective attacks Eq.
(5) in noisy quantum channels.
(bits per channel use)
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FIG. 4. The key rate (in bits per channel use) versus distance
d (in kilometers) in a standard telecom fiber (with attenua-
tion of −0.2dB/km) in the case of collective attacks on the
coherent-state protocol (orange, lower line) and the squeezed-
state protocol with VS = 1/10, 1/2 (upper, dark blue and
middle, light blue respectively). The premodulation chan-
nel coupling ratio ηE = 0.5 (dashed lines) and 1 i.e., the
absence of the channel (solid lines). Modulation variance is
optimized for given parameters, β = 97%, ǫ = 5%. Evidently
the premodulation channel reduces the secure distance of the
squeezed-state protocol. However, even small squeezing al-
lows one to achieve longer distances. Maximal influence of
the premodulation channel is set by the performance of the
coherent-state protocol.
B. Coherent- and squeezed-state protocols
The main aspect of the premodulation channel is
that it provides correlations (14) with the signal to the
external party and corrupts the initial carriers states
(12). The influence of such a channel can be viewed as
a preparation noise [15, 17], however, it also provides
an eavesdropper with additional correlations with the
signal. Furthermore, the premodulation channel can be
equivalent to side-channel leakage after the modulation
stage, provided QM is scaled by
√
ηE [19].
For VS = 1, assuming the initial state in the mode
ES is a vacuum state (VES = 1) we can immediately
conclude that such a lossy channel would not affect the
coherent-state protocol, since correlations (13) and (14)
will totally vanish, and mutual information between
trusted parties (15) will turn to a conventional form
(2). In other words, the access to the lossy side channel
would not provide the eavesdropper with any additional
advantage if the coherent-state protocol is used. For
VS < 1 and VES = 1 the correlation arises and this case
has to be analyzed in detail.
Direct reconciliation. Squeezed-state protocol is af-
fected by the presence of the side channel between the
source and modulator, since mutual information (15) di-
minishes, while information obtained by Eve (expressed
in terms of mutual information or Holevo bound for re-
spective attacks) increases. The lower bound on the key
rate (1) in a perfectly transmitting channel can be ex-
7pressed as
R|indDR|η→1 =
1
2
log2
[
1 +
VM
1 + ηE(VS − 1)
]
. (16)
The presence of the premodulation channel lowers the
overall key rate, however, secure key distribution is still
possible for any side channel coupling ratio ηE .
Reverse reconciliation. Similarly the squeezed-
state protocol key rate (1) will decrease due to the exis-
tence of the premodulation channel:
R|indRR|VM→∞ = −
1
2
log2
[
(1−η)(1+ηE(VS−1)η)
]
, (17)
though the key rate will still exceed the one for the
coherent-state protocol. In the case of individual attacks
and in the limit of high modulation (VM → ∞) the ad-
vantage of the squeezed-state over the coherent-state pro-
tocol is
(
R|sqRR −R|cohRR
)ind
VM→∞
= −1
2
log2[1+ηE(VS−1)η]. (18)
The premodulation channel grants adversary correla-
tions with the signal and they provide Eve an additional
advantage, comparing to the case of preparation noise
[15]. Such an advantage diminishes for low transmittance
quantum channels and is the highest for η → 1:
RES −R∆V =
1
2
log2
[
1 + VM + ηE(VS − 1)
VM + VS/(ηE + VS − ηEVS)
]
.
(19)
The correlations advantage RES −R∆V quickly disap-
pears for the high modulation (VM →∞).
Considering the noisy quantum channel and equiva-
lent entanglement-based system under collective attacks
(see Appendix B) premodulation channel impact is
similar to the previously described case of multimode
modulation. the squeezed-state protocol is still superior
to the coherent-state one in terms of the secure key
rate (5) and tolerance to the channel noise. Squeezing
optimization is not required as the key rate (5) lin-
early increases with an increase of squeezing. While
the premodulation channel does not pose a security
breaking threat, it can lower the secure distance (Fig.
4) and tolerance to the quantum channel excess noise
ε. Even though correlations (14) help an adversary, the
worst case scenario for trusted parties is substitution of
the initial squeezed state by the coherent states (VS = 1).
IV. CONCLUSIONS
We have investigated the negative impact of leakage
from trusted the preparation side, namely the correlated
multimode modulation of non-signal modes of the source
and signal loss prior to the modulation stage. We have
considered CV QKD coherent- and squeezed-state proto-
cols with direct and reverse reconciliation. We have ana-
lyzed prepare-and-measure and equivalent entanglement-
based models of leakage for cases of an illustrative indi-
vidual and more general collective attacks in noisy chan-
nels.
Multimode modulation of nonsignal modes of the
source limits the performance of both protocols and can
lead to a security break even in the case of individ-
ual attacks in a purely lossy channel. Surprisingly, the
coherent-state protocol can tolerate arbitrary amounts
of leakage, though only in the noiseless channel. On the
other hand, security of the squeezed-state protocol, with
an increase of modulation leakage, quickly becomes com-
promised without the need for an untrusted party to re-
sort to any additional manipulations onto the trusted
side. We show that squeezing, however, can be opti-
mized in order to improve the tolerance against multi-
mode modulation leakage and channel noise. The op-
timized squeezed protocol then overcomes the coherent
state protocol for any parameters.
The leakage from the preparation side prior to the
modulation stage introduces noise to the squeezed sig-
nal and establishes correlations with an eavesdropper.
While the coherent-state protocol is immune to such in-
fluence, the squeezed-state protocol suffers from secure
key rate deterioration and becomes more sensitive to the
excess noise in the channel. Nevertheless performance
of the squeezed-state protocol surpasses the one of the
coherent-state protocol, without the need for squeezing
optimization.
Our results together with previous studies [14, 19] de-
scribe the effects of the main possible mechanisms of in-
formation leakage from the trusted preparation side of
continuous-variable quantum key distribution protocols,
based on the most common linear passive coupling be-
tween optical modes. The results are stimulating for an
experimental test of the macroscopically multimode pro-
tocols [38–41]. They may also stimulate analysis of side
channels in MDI CV QKD protocols, where side-channel
attacks on the source are, in principle, possible and there-
fore relevant similarly to the case of discrete-variable pro-
tocols [42].
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8Appendix A: LEAKAGE FROM THE MULTIMODE MODULATOR
1. Multimode leakage
Using the initial values of quadrature variances of signal, leakage and untrusted channel modes (described in the
main text), and input-output relations [for arbitrary modes 1 and 2 with quadrature vectors υi = (xi, pi)
T ],
(
υ1
υ2
)
out
=
( √
T I
√
1− T I
−√1− T I √T I
)(
υ1
υ2
)
in
, (A1)
one can obtain the results of linear interactions in prepare-and-measure (P&M) multimode modulation scheme.
Provided the source radiates modes with identical variance (VL = VS) and the untrusted channel is purely lossy,
σB,LE =


√
ηkVM 0
0 −√ηkVM
−
√
(1− η)η(VM + VS − 1) 0
0
√
(1−η)η(VS−VMVS−1)
VS

 , (A2)
γLE =


VMk
2 + VS 0 −k
√
1− ηVM 0
0 VMk
2 + 1
VS
0 k
√
1− ηVM
−k√1− ηVM 0 VM + VS − η(VM + VS − 1) 0
0 k
√
1− ηVM 0 T + (1 − η)
(
VM +
1
VS
)

 , (A3)
where σB,LE (A2) describes correlations of Bob’s mode B with channel E and leakage L modes, γLE is a covariance
matrix of channel E and leakage mode L. The conditional covariance matrix can be obtained as
γX|Y = γX − σY,X [XγYX]MP σTY,X , (A4)
where X = Diag(1,0,0,0) and MP stands for Moore-Penrose pseudoinverse of the matrix [43]. Using Eq. (A4) and
elements of matrices (A2) and (A3), as well as the matrix describing states received by Bob γB =Diag([η(VS + VM −
1) + 1], 0, 0, [η(1/VS + VM − 1) + 1]), one can find VB|E = VB|LE = (VM + k2VM + VS)[η(k2VMV −1S + 1) + (1 −
η)(VM + k
2VM + VS)]
−1. The latter can be used to assess Eve’s mutual information with the trusted receiver side
IBE = 1/2 log2[VB/VB|LE], and consequently to find the key rate under individual attacks.
2. Purification
While P&M schemes can be used for illustration of
modus operandi of protocols and basic security analysis,
for an extensive analysis of Gaussian CV QKD protocols
one has to consider an entanglement-based scheme [44].
The latter are based on usage of entangled sources that
radiate two-mode Gaussian states described, in terms of
covariance matrices, as
γ =
(
V I
√
V 2 − 1σz√
V 2 − 1σz V I
)
, (A5)
with V being the variance of each mode, I is a two-
dimensional unity matrix, and σz is the Pauli matrix
σz =Diag(1,0,0,-1). Alice performs a homodyne or
heterodyne detection (depending on the protocol in-
tended for use) on one of the modes, thereby condition-
ally squeezing the other mode, resulting in states with
quadrature variances 1/V and V or coherent states. The
unmeasured and conditioned mode is a signal mode, that
is sent through the untrusted quantum channel (char-
acterized by losses η and excess noise ε) to Bob. This
technique yields fully equivalent results to P&M schemes
that prepare the signal state with the quadrature vari-
ance VS = 1/V (or VS = 1 if Alice performs the hetero-
dyne measurement), and subsequently apply Gaussian
modulation of variance VM .
The entanglement-based scheme with multimode mod-
ulation leakage should satisfy following conditions.
1. Neither states sent by Alice nor states received by
Bob nor correlations CAB between them should
be dependent on modulation (kQM , with variance
k2VM ) applied to states in the leakage mode.
2. The ratio between the leaking modulation and sig-
nal should be k ≥ 0 and it’s values can exceed 1,
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FIG. 5. Purification of modulation leakage (N = 1) on the
preparation side of the Gaussian CV QKD protocol. Alice’s
side contains two EPR sources, radiating modes A, B with
variance V1, and modes D, L, with variance V2. One mode
from each source is kept on the preparation side (A,D) while
the other two (B,L) interact on the beam splitter with trans-
mittance T1, undergo single-mode squeezing r1 and r2, respec-
tively, and subsequently interact on the beam splitter with
transmittance T2. Signal mode B proceeds through the un-
trusted channel (η, ε) to Bob, while the L mode is accessible
to Eve.
since generally the variance of the modulation ap-
plied can be greater than that applied to the signal
mode.
3. The ratio k cannot be influenced by a trusted
preparation party leaving only two parameters un-
der Alice’s control: signal modulation QM and
amount of squeezing in the state QS produced by
the source.
4. The optical configuration should be scalable con-
sidering the fact that the trusted source can have
an arbitrary multimodal structure.
One of the solutions that can satisfy all required con-
ditions is provided by the Bloch-Messiah decomposition
theorem [32], which says that the multimode evolution
of an optical system governed by the linear Bogoliubov
transformations can be decomposed into a combination
of linear and nonlinear optical components (multiport in-
terferometers, and single-mode squeezers).
Let us consider the purification of two-mode modula-
tion, i.e., the signal and leakage modes, as in Fig. 5. On
the preparation side there are two sources; each generates
a pair of entangled modes A,B and L,D, respectively.
The states QA, QB (Q represents X or P quadrature)
in modes A,B initially have a variance V1, while states
QL, QD in modes L,D have variance V2. One mode from
each source, e.g., B and L, interact on a beam splitter
with transmittance T1. The mode interaction effect on
the covariance matrix γABLD is given by input-output
relations (A1).
Further, states in modes B and L are squeezed on
individual single-mode squeezers (characterized by the
squeezing parameter ri), resulting in the change of
states quadrature variance by e−2ri or e2ri . Subse-
quently modes interact, according to Eq. (A1), on the
beam splitter with transmittance T2. As a result the
four-mode covariance matrix γABLD after the interac-
tions becomes γ′ABLD and depends on six parameters:
Leakage
Eve
S0
H
B
A
V
D
T1
H
C T1
η
E
ES
+ε
FIG. 6. Purification of Gaussian CV QKD protocol with side
channel between source and modulation. Source S radiates
signal (mode B) that, using entangled source V (modes C,D),
receives amplitude and phase modulation, and is sent to Bob,
that conducts homodyne detection H . Source S0 (mode A)
generates infinitely squeezed states that are kept on prepara-
tion side. Source SE (mode ES) establishes correlations with,
and provides Eve with information about signal (B). Losses
η and noise ε in untrusted channel (mode E) are attributed
to Eve.
T1, T2, r1, r2, V1, V2. The elements of the covariance ma-
trix γ′ABLD can be used to form a set of equations:
VB(X) =− 2t1t2e−V− + e−2r1T2(T1V− + V2)
+ e−2r2(1− T2)(V1 − T1V−),
VB(P ) =2t1t2e−V− + e
−2r1(1− T2)(T1V− + V2)
+ e−2r2T2(V1 − T1V−),
VL(X) =− 2t1t2e+V− + e2r1T2(T1V− + V2)
+ e2r2(1− T2)(V1 − T1V−),
VL(P ) =2t1t2e+V− + e
2r1(1 − T2)(T1V− + V2)
+ e2r2T2(V1 − T1V−),
CBL(X) =t1(1− 2T2)e−V− + t2(e−2r2(V1 − T1V−)
− e−2r1(T1V− + V2)),
CBL(P ) =t1(1− 2T2)e+V− + t2(e2r2(V1 − T1V−)
− e2r1(T1V− + V2)).
(A6)
where V− = V1 − V2, t1(2) =
√
(1− T1(2))T1(2), and
e± = e
±(r1+r2). To find the solutions of Eq. (A6) one
can substitute the left-hand side for the respective vari-
ances of states in the signal, and leakage modes, and
their covariances as follows: VB(X) → VS+VM , VB(P ) →
1/VS+VM , VL(X) → VS+k2VM , VL(P ) → 1/VS+k2VM ,
and CBL(X) → kVM , CBL(P ) → −kVM . Solving Eq.(A6)
for given k, VS , VM will yield numerical values of param-
eters T1, T2, r1, r2, V1, V2 and subsequently a numerical
covariance matrix γ′ABLD that can further be used to in-
corporate the effect of the untrusted quantum channel
(η, ε) and analyze the security of the Gaussian coherent-
or squeezed-state CV QKD protocol. The same approach
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can be used to purify cases of N mode leakage, however N entangled sources are required, increasing the amount
of parameters and equations in (A6) to N(1 +N).
Appendix B: PREMODULATION LEAKAGE
1. Pure losses
Let us now consider the generic CV QKD protocol (without the multimode modulator) and the presence of the
channel between the source and the modulator. Results of linear interactions (A1) in the P&M scheme in purely lossy
channel can be described by
σB,ESE =


(1− VS)
√
ηEη(1 − ηE) 0
0 − 1−VS
VS
√
ηEη(1− ηE)
(ηE − VM − ηEVS)
√
(1− η)η 0
0 (ηE − ηE+VMVSVS )
√
(1− η)η

 , (B1)
σESE =
(
(VS − 1)
√
(1 − η)(1− ηE)ηE 0
0 (1−VS)
VS
√
(1− η)(1 − ηE)ηE
)
, (B2)
γE =
(
η + (1− η)(VM + ηE(VS − 1) + 1) 0
0
(
VM + ηE(V
−1
S − 1) + 1
)
(1 − η) + η
)
, (B3)
γES =
(
VS + (1− VS)ηE 0
0 1+ηE(VS−1)
VS
)
, (B4)
where σB,ESE is the matrix describing Eve’s correlations to the signal mode after premodulation leakage and losses,
σESE describes correlations between modes accessible to Eve, and the variances (in X and P quadratures) of the
latter are given by γE , and γES . One can use Eqs. (A4) and (B1)–(B4) to find the variance of Alice and Bob states
conditioned by measurements of modes accessible to Eve:
VA|E =
VS [VM (1 + (1− η)VS) + VS ] + ηE(1− VS)[η(VM − VS) + (1− η)VMVS ]
VS [1− η + (1− η)VM + η] + ηE(1− VS)[(1− η)VM + η] , (B5)
VB|E =
ηEVM + VS(VM (1 − ηE) + 1)
VS [1 + ηE(1− VS)((1 − η)VM + η) + (1− η)VM ] , (B6)
Eve’s mutual information with a trusted party IAE = 1/2 log2[VA/VA|E ], or IBE = 1/2 log2[VB/VB|E ] can be
calculated using, respectively, Eq. (B5) or (B6) and further used to assess the key rate under individual attacks.
2. Purification
In the case of the side channel present between the source and the modulator, the purification can similarly be done
using Bloch-Messiah decomposition (as in Appendix A2), however, we adopt a general purification scheme as in Fig.
6 [19].
Alice on the preparation side operates an EPR source (A5) that radiates into modes C and D, source S that produces
the signal state in mode B and source S0 that produces the infinitely squeezed state in mode A. Modes produced by
the EPR source have variance VM/(1 − T1) and are, respectively, coupled to modes from other the two sources on
strongly unbalanced beam splitters T1. The leakage is modelled as a signal interaction (A1) with the vacuum mode
on a beam splitter with transmittance ηE . The signal further proceeds to the unbalanced beam splitter T1 where
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it interacts with mode D that carries information and further is sent to the untrusted channel where it suffers from
losses η and noise ε. Mode A carrying the infinitely squeezed state (to simulate the detection on the trusted side)
interacts with first entangled mode C on another strongly unbalanced beam splitter characterized by the same value
of transmittance T1.
After the interactions, the state that is kept on the preparation side can be described by the variances as: VA(X) =
VS0T1 + VM , VA(P ) = T1/(VS0) + VM , and the state that is sent to Bob through the untrusted channel as: VB =
(VSηE + (1 − ηE)VE1)T1 + VM , while these two states are correlated as CAB = −
√
(V 2M − (1− T1)2)η. In the limit
T1 → 1 these correspond to the P&M scheme with the premodulation channel—generation of the signal state with
variance VS , the premodulation channel interaction with output accessible to Eve and further amplitude and/or phase
Gaussian modulation of variance VM . The measurement conducted by Alice conditions Bob’s state to: VB|A(X) =
T1((1− ηE)VE1 + ηEVS)+ (T1−1)
2−V 2M
T1V0+VM
+VM , VB|A(P ) = T1
(
(1 − ηE)VE1 + ηEVS
)
+
V0((T1−1)2−V 2M)
T1+V0VM
+VM . In the regime
T1 = 1, V0 = 1 and VE1 = 1, ηE = 1 states reduce to VB|A(X) = VS , and VB|A(P ) = 1/VS + VM that corresponds
to modulation with variance VM applied to both quadratures of the signal state described initially by variances
in respective quadratures VS , 1/VS with only one value (x) being kept. The resulting six-mode covariance matrix
(including premodulation ES and untrusted E channels) γABCDESE allows one to further analyze the security of the
Gaussian coherent- or squeezed-state CV QKD protocol.
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